Are there landmines in afghanistan

The Rabbani government declared its support for an immediate and comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines in a statement to the U. Human Rights Commission in Geneva in March It had previously, during the preparatory meetings for the Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, called for a ban on production and export, but not use.

General Assembly Resolution calling on states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines. It was absent for the votes on the pro-ban UNGA resolutions in and The government attended the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, but did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration of June , and did not participate in the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September The Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines ACBL reports that all of the major military opposition factions have expressed their support for the landmine ban process, but no formal written statements have been provided yet.

There is no evidence of antipersonnel landmine production in Afghanistan, past or current, by any government or warring faction. Afghanistan is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. However, there are unconfirmed reports of small-scale smuggling of landmines to some neighboring parts of Pakistan, Kashmir and Sri Lanka. The former Soviet Union supplied large quantities of antipersonnel mines to pro-Soviet Afghan governments.

The exact types and quantities of mines transferred cannot be ascertained. The U. Fifty types of mines from ten countries have been found in Afghanistan. See list below. The Taliban has accused Iran of supplying mines to the opposition forces in Afghanistan, a charge Iran has denied. In December, the Taliban said it captured antipersonnel mines with Iranian markings from the opposition in Bangi district of the northern province of Takhar.

In an interview, a representative of the ousted Rabbani government acknowledged that its forces were still using, and actively importing, antipersonnel mines. He indicated that Tajikistan was now the main supply route for mines, mostly of Soviet origin. It appears that the Taliban and all of the warring factions have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, but there are no reliable estimates of the quantities available. The list below of mines encountered in Afghanistan may give some indication of mine types in stockpile.

There are no indications that the Taliban or any warring faction has begun destruction of stockpiles. The vast majority of mines now in Afghanistan were laid by the Soviet Union in its war with the mujahideen from Many of the mines were remotely delivered, by helicopter and airplane.

Soviet and Afghan government troops placed antipersonnel mines around their security posts, military bases and strategic points for protection; in the outskirts of cities to stop the advancement of mujahideen forces; as well as in and around villages to depopulate them to reduce local support for the mujahideen.

The mujahideen planted mines mainly antitank in the main roads and supply routes of Soviet and government troops to reduce their mobility and cut short their supplies. Most of these mines were laid in and around the provinces bordering Iran and Pakistan, and alongside the Salang highway connecting Kabul with the former Soviet Union.

Various mujahideen factions have been fighting since , and all sides have used antipersonnel mines. In particular, large numbers of mines were planted in different parts of Kabul City and its outskirts during factional war after the fall of communist regime in , and when the Taliban ousted the Rabbani government from Kabul in September There have been press reports of new use of mines by both sides in late and early A military official from the ousted government has admitted that it is still using mines, justifying it as a legitimate and useful weapon.

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Our Work. We are very excited that our village is now free of landmines. We are now able to attend school without any fear. An estimate can be garnered from the figures for the year alone which were about 4, Peaks of mine casualties were recorded in and again in These increases coincide with two phenomenon.

The first was a large influx of returning refugees in , many of whom entered mined areas in the region on their return without knowing the full extent of the dangerous areas. The second peak represents an upsurge in military activity between the Kabul government and the Taliban movement. This military activity included the large scale use of mines in the city of Kabul itself, which resulted in a large number of casualties, both combatants and civilians.

A comparative study of people admitted in various hospitals due to mine injuries and others as shown in Table 2 is as follows:. There is no evidence of landmine production in Afghanistan, past or current, by any government or warring faction. The pro-Soviet Afghan government received supplies of large quantities of antipersonnel AP mines from the former Soviet Union.

The US and its allies provided mines to the Mujahideen and Iran has been accused of supplying mines to the opposition forces. Though exact types and quantities of mines transferred cannot be ascertained, types of mines from several countries have been found in Afghanistan and are listed below in Table Afghanistan has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Taliban has formal diplomatic recognition from only three governments. However, statements in support of a comprehensive ban on AP mines have been made by both the Taliban and the ousted government. It had previously, during the preparatory meetings for the Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, called for a ban on production and export, but not use. The government attended the preparatory meeting of the Ottawa Process but did not participate in the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September The Geneva Accords signed in April signalled the end of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and it was widely assumed that the government led by President Najibullah would not survive the withdrawal of Soviet forces and that an administration reflecting the composition of the Mujahideen resistance would soon take over.

The general expectation was that peace would prevail and millions of refugees would flood home from neighbouring countries. As landmines led to total disruption of lives in Afghanistan, there was realisation of an immediate need for a massive humanitarian and economic rehabilitation programme to facilitate repatriation and the reconstruction of basic infrastructure and services in the country. Prevalence of landmines represented a serious threat to peace building activities, including regeneration of agricultural production and thus demining came as the most important challenge for the region, which was also important in order to avoid massive casualty rates.

UNOCHA organised interagency assessment missions in and subsequently initiated cross-border operations. The peace consolidation initiative in Afghanistan did not involve the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission as happened in countries such as Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique where formal peace treaties have been concluded. In the absence of a recognised government, UNOCHA took responsibility for planning, resource mobilisation, and developing a dialogue with donors and other concerned parties, including UN agencies and NGOs involved in relief and rehabilitation activities.

Due to the absence of standing UN capability to deal with mines, Governments of France, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States were invited to provide expertise to assess the problem. The assessment was based on secondhand, and largely anecdotal, information because military personnel seconded to UNOCHA were not allowed by their governments to visit Afghanistan and were largely based in Islamabad.

The assessment teams initially reported that the mines were placed not only for military-strategic purposes but also to restrict the socio-economic activities in Afghanistan. It was largely successful in ensuring that external funding was provided in a manner that supported a cohesive approach.

Each year UNMCP has been successful in raising a higher proportion of its proposed budget through this appeal process. European Union EU funding for mine action activities has been significant. But EU financed projects are clearly coordinated with UNMCP with respect to technical and financial procedures, levels of pay and conditions of service.

The mine action programme attracted funds successfully and thus was able to operate effectively even in the middle of political instability and sporadic warfare. Also, this was certainly a reflection of concern of the international community to combat the problem of mines. Also, with the change of course in the programme, it became necessary to find implementing partners which could operate in Afghanistan. There was a great deal of skepticism regarding the creation of Afghan NGOs into a viable proposition, given both the nature of Afghan politics and the conflicting interests of various parties in the struggle for political supremacy long waged in Afghanistan.

Providing Afghan NGOs with grants for specified tasks effectively insulated the mine action programme in the field from the constraints of UN rules and regulations on procurement of equipment and recruitment of personnel.

Apart from financial assistance, technical assistance was also granted to the NGOs. The system of contracting out work to the NGOs meant that it was the responsibility of the NGO and its director to establish an internal management structure that was able to deliver the result for which it was contracted.

These NGOs were established as autonomous entities. To a certain extent, they were an intrinsic part of the UN led Afghan mine action programme.

For victim assistance, numerous international and national NGOs provide medical treatment, rehabilitation and prosthetic devices. Mine awareness was given a significant position in the UN programme and the agencies involved in mine awareness have increased in number and function